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Key points summary 
• We induced embodiment of a virtual body and its movements were controlled by two 
different BCI paradigms – one based on signals from sensorimotor versus one from 
visual cortical areas. 
• BCI-control of movements engenders agency, but not equally for all paradigms. 
• Cortical sensorimotor activation correlates with agency and responsibility. 
• This has significant implications for neurological rehabilitation and neuroethics. 
Abstract 
Agency is the attribution of an action to the self and is a prerequisite for experiencing 
responsibility over its consequences. Here we investigated agency and responsibility by 
studying the control of movements of an embodied avatar, via brain computer interface 
(BCI) technology, in immersive virtual reality. After induction of virtual body ownership 
by visuomotor correlations, healthy participants performed a motor task with their virtual 
body. We compared the passive observation of the subject’s ‘own’ virtual arm performing 
the task with (1) the control of the movement through activation of sensorimotor areas 
(motor imagery) and (2) the control of the movement through activation of visual areas 
(steady-state visually evoked potentials). The latter two conditions were carried out using a 
brain–computer interface (BCI) and both shared the intention and the resulting action. We 
found that BCI-control of movements engenders the sense of agency, which is strongest 
for sensorimotor areas activation. Furthermore, increased activity of sensorimotor areas, as 
measured using EEG, correlates with levels of agency and responsibility. We discuss the 
implications of these results for the neural bases of agency, but also in the context of novel 
therapies involving BCI and the ethics of neurotechnology. 
 
Introduction 
The feeling of generating actions that can influence the course of events in the outside 
world is a central feature of human experience and is important for our perception of the 
self (Haggard, 2017). The attribution of actions to ourselves is referred to as “agency” 
(Gallagher, 2000), which gives us a feeling of control and results in a sense of 
responsibility over an action’s outcome.  
Through brain-computer interfaces (BCI) it is feasible to control the actions of surrogate 
bodies, prostheses, robots, or other effectors. Such BCI systems are based on a closed 
feedback loop, in which neural activity related to an intention is transformed in real-time 
into a command to a device that then gives feedback to the participant (Birbaumer, 2006; 
Hochberg et al., 2012; Pfurtscheller & Neuper, 2001). Different types of BCI are available, 
some of which rely on changes in the sensorimotor mu-rhythm induced through motor 
imagery. For such motor-imagery-related BCI it has been shown that discrepancies 
between the neural activity and the resulting visual feedback can result in a decreased sense 
of agency (Evans, Gale, Schurger, & Blanke, 2015; Marchesotti et al., 2017). However, 
whether and how agency can be modulated by the usage of other BCI systems has not been 
investigated. 
Agency is closely linked to body ownership—the feeling that “this body is my body”—and 
although agency and body ownership can be dissociated (Imaizumi & Asai, 2015; Kalckert 
& Ehrsson, 2012; Tsakiris, Longo, & Haggard, 2010), agency has been shown to 
significantly correlate with body ownership (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012). 
Both body ownership and agency are aspects of self-consciousness, which might not be a 
unique elemental percept or qualia but rather a cluster of subjective experiences, feelings, 
and attitudes (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008; Tsakiris et al., 2010). The neural 
underpinnings of agency have been extensively investigated (for an overview see David 
(2012) and Haggard (2017)) and might lie in the connectivity between several brain areas, 
rather than in any single brain structure. A possible candidate is the connectivity between 
areas involved in action initiation and areas involved in monitoring of perceptual events, 
which have been proposed as neural correlates (Haggard, 2017). For events caused by an 
external agent (external agency), neuroimaging studies report activation of a complex brain 
network including the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, precuneus, temporoparietal junction 
and pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA). However, for agency-related activity the 
insula seems to be the most consistently reported area (Haggard, 2017; Sperduti, Delaveau, 
Fossati, & Nadel, 2011). On the other hand, interference with activity in the pre-SMA by 
means of transcranial stimulation has been shown to alter agency (Cavazzana, Penolazzi, 
Begliomini, & Bisiacchi, 2015; Moore, Ruge, Wenke, Rothwell, & Haggard, 2010), 
pointing to an involvement of motor areas in the development of the sense of agency. The 
role of motor areas in the sense of agency is theoretically supported by a computational 
model of agency, the comparator model (Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000), which is 
based on a model for sensorimotor integration (Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995) and 
describes agency as the result of a matching between predicted and actual sensory feedback 
of a planned motor action (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000; Frith et al., 2000). Further, 
brain regions related to BCI control not related to the comparator model have been 
identified in the basal ganglia, the anterior cingulate cortex and the left superior frontal 
gyrus (Marchesotti et al., 2017). 
Under certain conditions, we can perceive agency over an agent’s action without 
performing that action with our own body, which is referred to as “illusory agency”. For 
example, one can perceive agency over another person’s hand movements when seeing that 
hand at the position where one would expect one’s own hand to be and when there is a 
prior command to carry out the later seen actions (Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004). 
Experiments on agency have also been conducted in immersive virtual environments, 
where a virtual body can be felt as one’s own after inducing adequate sensorimotor 
correlations (Sanchez-Vives, Spanlang, Frisoli, Bergamasco, & Slater, 2010; Slater, Perez-
Marcos, Ehrsson, & Sanchez-Vives, 2008; Slater, Pérez-Marcos, Ehrsson, & Sanchez-
Vives, 2009). Impressively, during this “virtual embodiment” experience, people may 
attribute actions of the virtual body to themselves even though they are not performing 
those actions with their real body (Banakou & Slater, 2014; Kokkinara, Kilteni, Blom, & 
Slater, 2016).  
Drawing upon these premises, our objective was to investigate whether and how the sense 
of agency over a virtual limb movement controlled through a BCI was generated. In order 
to generate a movement through BCI there is first an intention. Next, the brain signal is 
used by the BCI to initiate the movement, however different signals (or paradigms) can be 
used. Here we questioned: do agency levels differ between different BCI methods? How 
relevant is the cortical area that the BCI uses for the initiation of the movement? And, if 
agency over a BCI-controlled action is induced, is there also a feeling of responsibility with 
respect to the results of that action?  
To answer these questions we designed and carried out an experiment to measure cortical 
activation patterns, sense of agency, and the sense of responsibility with respect to 
movements of an “embodied” virtual body in an immersive virtual environment (Slater et 
al., 2008; Slater, Spanlang, Sanchez-Vives, & Blanke, 2010) and compared three different 
paradigms to initiate the movements of a virtual arm: motor imagery, activating 
sensorimotor areas, (Pfurtscheller, Brunner, Schlögl, & Lopes da Silva, 2006; Pfurtscheller 
& Neuper, 1997); visually evoked potentials, activating visual cortical areas (Middendorf, 
McMillan, Calhoun, & Jones, 2000; Vialatte, Maurice, Dauwels, & Cichocki, 2010); and 
passive, non-triggered movements.  
Methods 
Participants 
Sixty-two healthy, right-handed females with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no 
neurological or psychological disorders, and no medication intake that could influence their 
perception were screened for the experiment. After the screening procedure, a sample of 40 
participants completed the experiment. All participants were novices to BCI. To maintain a 
similar level of accuracy for BCI conditions, we used the inverse of the binomial 
cumulative distribution for finding the threshold for non-random (at P=0.001) classification 
of epochs. This threshold was in our case 30/40=0.75 (i.e. 75%), leaving a remaining 
sample of 29 participants (mean age=21.5 years, SD=2.6; laterality quotient (Oldfield, 
1971): mean=71.0, SD=23.4). All participants were naïve to the research question, gave 
written informed consent before starting the experiment, and received €5–20 for their 
participation. The experiment was approved by the local ethics committee (Comité Ético de 
Investigación Clínica de la Corporación Sanitaria, Hospital Clínic de Barcelona) and is in 
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
Virtual environment and tracking system 
The virtual environment was programmed and controlled using the Unity game engine 
(Unity Technologies, www.unity3d.com) and displayed through a HMD (Oculus Rift 
Development Kit 2, www.oculus.com) with a nominal field-of-view of 100°, a resolution of 
960 × 1080 pixels per eye, and a 75 Hz frame rate. The virtual bodies were taken from the 
Rocketbox library (Rocketbox Studios GmbH, www.rocketbox.de). Further details about 
the laboratory setups to create and measure virtual embodiment illusions can be found in 
Spanlang et al. (2014). The virtual room was a custom-made replica of a virtual reality 
laboratory. During the embodiment phase, movements of the right hand were tracked with 
the right arm setup of Perception Neuron (Noitom, Beijing, China), a full-body tracking 
system. 
Electroencephalographic recordings 
Electrographic data were captured with 64 active Ag/AgCl ring electrodes (g.LADYbird, 
g.tec, Schiedlberg, Austria), amplified with g.HIamp (g.tec) and recorded with Matlab 
R2013a Simulink software (The MathWorks, Inc., Natrick, USA) on a separate computer. 
During the data acquisition, signals were band-pass filtered between 0.5 and 250 Hz, notch 
filtered at 50 Hz, and digitized at a rate of 512 Hz. Fifty-nine EEG electrodes were mounted 
on a g.Gamma cap (g.tec) and had standard positions in accordance with the 10-percent 
electrode system (Chatrian, Lettich, & Nelson, 1985). The ground electrode was located at 
AFz. The two electrooculographic (EOG) electrodes were placed next to the outer canthus 
and below the right eye. EOG and EEG electrodes were referenced to the right ear. The two 
electromyographic (EMG) electrodes had a bipolar montage and were located over the 
distal section and belly of the anterior deltoid muscle. Data were analyzed offline using 
Matlab and the Berlin Brain-Computer Interface toolbox 
(https://github.com/bbci/bbci_public) (Benjamin Blankertz et al., 2016) and online using 
Matlab Simulink. To compensate for network latencies between the two computers, we 
synchronized them by using the network time protocol and time-stamped triggers with the 
times of the Unity and the Matlab computer. Triggers were then adapted in the analysis so 
that the time stamps would match. 
SMR-based BCI 
The sensorimotor rhythm (SMR)-based BCI used the Common Spatial Pattern (CSP) 
approach (B Blankertz, Tomioka, Lemm, Kawanabe, & Muller, 2008; Fukunaga, 1990; 
Graimann & Pfurtscheller, 2006; Koles, Lind, & Soong, 1995; Müller-Gerking, 
Pfurtscheller, & Flyvbjerg, 1999) to extract event-related desynchronization (ERD) over 
sensorimotor areas from 27 channels (see Fig. S1) and was provided by g.tec (“Common 
Spatial Patterns 2-class BCI”, V2.14.01). This is an established approach for distinguishing 
two classes of motor imagery, which were in our case imagination of a right arm pressing a 
button  (similar to the movement they saw in the virtual environment) and a left foot 
movement (extension and flexion of the ankle joint). The foot movement served to create 
the classifier.  
Motor imagery training 
Before the actual experiment, participants undertook motor imagery training consisting of 
two parts, both outside virtual reality. In the initial part we taught participants how to 
imagine the movement in order to produce the greatest changes in the SMR (this took up to 
25 min), and in the second part participants did up to four training sessions with the BCI, 
which followed the training procedure recommended by g.tec (Guger, Edlinger, Harkam, 
Niedermayer, & Pfurtscheller, 2003). In the majority of the participants one of the four 
training session was done directly before the motor imagery condition. The initial part of 
the training was inspired by (Ethan et al., 2008) and participants were asked to (1) to 
repetedly press a button in front of them with their right arm, (2) to imagine the action of 
the right arm, (3) to repeatedly lift the heal and the tip of their left foot, (4) to imagine the 
action of their left foot, (5) to alternatingly imagine the hand and foot action. The SMR-
BCI training sessions were performed in front of a computer screen. Participants were 
sitting on a chair with their arms on a table in front of them, they were instructed not to 
move and to keep their body relaxed. The training started with a fixation cross displayed in 
the middle of the screen. After 3 s an arrow was shown for 1.25 s which pointed either to 
the right or down. The participants were instructed to imagine the previously learned arm 
movement when the arrow pointed to the right or the foot movement when the arrow 
pointed down for the next 5 seconds until the arrow disappeared. In the following training 
sessions feedback on the classification result of the BCI was given to the participant 
between seconds 4.25 and 8. Specifics of the procedure can be found in (C Guger et al., 
2003). 
SSVEP-based BCI 
The visual evoked potential this BCI system was based on were steady state visual evoked 
potentials (SSVEP), which can be evoked by a visual stimulus flickering at a specific 
frequency. The SSVEP-based BCI extracted the signal from eight occipital channels (see 
Fig. S1), was provided by g.tec (“SSVEP BCI”, V2.14.01), and modified for its use in a 
virtual environment. SSVEP stimuli were two buttons in the virtual environment; one 
blinked at a frequency of 7.5 Hz and the other at 9.4 Hz. An extra, dummy frequency (20 
Hz) was also used during the SSVEP training phase to be able to form a better classifier.  
SSVEP training 
The SSVEP-training was performed while participants wore the HMD and was adapted 
from Guger et al., (2012). Each frequency required five training trials and took about 4 min. 
Only the frequency of interest was displayed during the training phase; during the 
experiment, both frequencies (7.5 and 9.5 Hz) were displayed at the same time. Participants 
were sitting in a chair with their hands on the table in front of them and wore the head 
mounted display. The 20 Hz frequency was utilized as dummy frequency in order to get a 
more precise classifier. This frequency was neither displayed during the training phase nor 
during the experiment, instead participants were instructed to look in the middle of the two 
(not blinking) buttons (a fixation cross was displayed at beginning of each trial at that 
point). The SSVEP training had 15 trials, 5 for each frequency and took about 4 minutes. In 
order to get a better classifier, only the frequency of interest was displayed during the 
training phase. Later, during the experiment, both frequencies (7.5 and 9.4 Hz) were 
displayed simultaneously. 
Experimental procedure 
All instructions were pre-recorded and given to participants through headphones. 
Preparation of EEG electrodes took about 40 min. Before starting the experiment, 
participants did the training for the SMR- and SSVEP-based BCIs. The classifiers of both 
training programs were calculated using gBSanalyze (Version 5.16.00, g.tec). 
Executed Movement 
Executed Movement was recorded in 18 out of the 29 participants in order to capture the 
brain activity for each participant while moving their real right arm. Through headphones 
participants heard a beep every 8 s with a jitter of ± 1 s. They were instructed to move their 
right hand and press a button in front of them (within 2 s) whenever they heard a beep, 
performing a movement that resembled the virtual movement.  
Experimental conditions 
Participants were asked to sit comfortably on a chair with their arms lying on a table in 
front of them keeping a distance of 55 cm between their middle fingers (Fig. S2). Each 
experimental condition started with an embodiment phase followed by the action phase. In 
both phases participants saw a virtual body from a first person perspective in the same 
position and collocated with their real body. 
Embodiment phase. When visualizing the virtual environment, participants were instructed 
to look around and describe what they saw, thereby inducing a feeling of presence in the 
virtual environment. They were further instructed to look down at the virtual body. Next, 
they were instructed to move their right hand and fingers for 1 min. These movements were 
tracked and mapped onto the movements of the virtual body, so that participants saw the 
right virtual arm moving in the same way. This procedure was carried out to induce a sense 
of body ownership and agency over the virtual body regardless of the condition. Directly 
after this, the questionnaire items IControlledArm and MyBody were presented on the 
virtual screen in randomized order (see Table 1). 
Action phase. Directly after the embodiment phase, participants were instructed to keep still 
for the rest of the experimental condition and to only move the left hand when giving 
responses to the questionnaire items. The virtual environment was the same as during the 
embodiment phase, except that now they saw two buttons on the table in front of them (Fig. 
S3), each blinking at one of the SSVEP frequencies.  
All participants went through the following three conditions: the MotorImagery condition, 
the SSVEP condition, and the Observe condition, each consisting of 40 trials. The order of 
conditions was balanced over participants. Each trial started with a fixation cross displayed 
between the two buttons, followed 2 s later by an arrow indicating the target button for that 
particular trial. In the following 6 s participants had to either imagine the arm movement 
(MotorImagery condition), focus on the indicated button (SSVEP condition), or simply 
observe what was happening (Observe condition). This phase is also referred to as the 
preparation phase. During MotorImagery and SSVEP conditions the previously trained 
classifiers detected whether participants imagined the arm movement (MotorImagery) or to 
which button they looked (SSVEP); that is, if the frequency of the indicated button or if 
sensorimotor activity in arm areas were detected, the virtual arm would move toward the 
target button; if not, participants would hear an error sound to indicate a missed trial and 
the arm would not move. Missed trials were repeated one additional time. In the Observe 
condition, the arm moved in each trial to the target button. Fig. S3 displays the timeline of 
one trial. Every 10 trials participants responded to the IControlledArm item (Table 1). 
During each experimental condition the virtual arm accidentally threw an object off the 
table resulting in a breaking sound (Fig. S4). This happened four times throughout each 
condition at a random trial once during each block of 10 trials (but not directly before or 
after they were answering the IControlledArm item). The objects were a pencil stand, a 
vase, a coffee cup, and a glass, and they appeared in random order. Directly after the virtual 
arm broke an object, participants answered the IBrokeObject item (Table 1). One of the 
four trials was a catch trial, which was included to test our items’ internal validity.  
Questionnaires 
Table 1 displays all questionnaire items. Some items were displayed inside the virtual 
reality environment (MyBody, IControlledArm, IBrokeObject) and others outside on a 
computer screen (MyBody, MySound, ITouchedObject, MyMovement, ArmMovedItself). 
In the horizontal visual analogue scale for item 3, 0 corresponded to “the movement of 
another person” and 10 to “my movement” (see Table 1). Note that we used reverse 
wording when designing question 4, therefore its scale was reversed for the analysis.  
Questionnaire items inside the virtual environment were displayed on a virtual screen. 
Participants gave their responses by turning a button (Power Mate, Griffin Technologies, 
Nashville, USA) located next to their left hand. VAS ratings, indicated by a little red bar, 
increased when the button was turned right and decreased when it was turned left. 
Participants confirmed their rating by pressing the button. In order to avoid interfering with 
the sense of body ownership, while rating the questionnaire items and therefore moving the 
left hand, the view of the virtual forearms was blocked by a virtual board.  
Directly after each condition participants answered five questionnaire items outside the 
virtual environment, which were displayed on a laptop screen. In this case, participants 
answered the items using the keyboard. Questionnaire items were displayed in random 
order (see Table 1). Using a principal component factor analysis which resulted in one 
variable, the items IBrokeObject and ITouchedObject were merged to the variable 
ResponsibilityPCF, and the items IControlledArm, MyMovement, and ArmMovedItself 
were merged to the variable AgencyPCF. Initially we included also MySound, but excluded 
it later, because the resulting variable AgencyPCF explained more variance without this 
item (81% of variance versus 75% when including MySound). The continuous ratings of 
the MyBody item were down-scaled into ordinal ratings ranging from 1 to 10. 
Processing of EEG data 
Artifact identification 
Very noisy EEG channels were visually identified and removed from further analysis (this 
affected on average one to two channels in five participants). During data collection, one 
electrode (F5) broke and we continued without it (this affected 12 participants). For artifact 
detection the signal was filtered between 0.5 Hz and 40 Hz. Eye blink artifacts were 
identified and projected from EEG data with Independent Component Analysis (ICA) 
performed on concatenated epoched data (FastICA (Hyvärinen & Oja, 2000)). Epochs were 
generated around the onset of the arrow and consisted of 1000 ms of pre-stimulus and 6000 
ms of post-stimulus interval. The epochs were visually inspected for the presence of 
muscular and mechanical artifacts, indicated by the variance of the maximal activity and by 
the Mahalanobis distance (Nikulin, Hohlefeld, Jacobs, & Curio, 2008). Within different 
subjects we identified between 0% and 8% of epochs. 
Executed Movement 
Artifacts in the Executed Movement data were visually identified in epochs ranging from 
1000 to 3000 ms around the tone indicating the start of the movement and those epochs 
containing them were removed at a later step in the analysis (0–25% of epochs). 
Amplitude modulation of spontaneous alpha oscillations 
We were interested in alpha oscillations because they have the largest signal-to-noise ratio 
of all spontaneous oscillations and therefore allow a reliable estimation of ERD (Nierula, 
Hohlefeld, Curio, & Nikulin, 2013; Nikouline et al., 2000; Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva, 
1999), which is important for obtaining clear spatial patterns. Moreover, alpha oscillations 
have been previously shown to be a reliable indicator of engagement of cortical areas in 
different experimental conditions including sensory and motor tasks (Berger, 1929; Gastaut 
& Bert, 1954; Pfurtscheller & Aranibar, 1977; Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva, 1999). 
Identifying individual sensorimotor alpha range 
The individual sensorimotor alpha peak frequencies were identified in the pre-stimulus 
spectrum of Laplace transformed channel C3 (Graimann & Pfurtscheller, 2006; Hjorth, 
1975). The signal of all conditions and the executed movement was then filtered in a range 
of ± 2 Hz around the individual peak frequency. 
Identifying individual ERD peak latencies in executed movement data 
The filtered and Laplace transformed signal was Hilbert transformed in order to obtain its 
amplitude envelope (Clochon, Fontbonne, Lebrun, & Etevenon, 1996; Graimann & 
Pfurtscheller, 2006; Rosenblum & Kurths, 1998). The signal was next cut into epochs from 
1000 to 3000 ms around the tone and epochs containing artifacts were removed from 
further analysis. ERD% was calculated using the following equation: ERD% (t)= (AMP (t) 
– PRE) / PRE · 100, where AMP (amplitude) refers to the activity at each time point t of 
the averaged epochs and PRE is the mean amplitude in the pre-stimulus interval (from 500 
to 0 ms). Time points with lowest ERD% were identified between 0 and 1500 ms in 
Laplace transformed channel C3 (n=18, latency: mean=808 ms, SD=228 ms). 
Extracting CSP in Executed Movement data 
The filtered, Hilbert-transformed, epoched, and cleaned executed movement signal was 
used for CSP analysis. No ICA was applied because prior application of another spatial 
filtering could lead to possible deterioration in the performance of CSP (Blankertz et al., 
2008; Nierula et al., 2013). For CSP, pre-stimulus epochs, filtered in the individual alpha 
range, were merged from executed movement and all three experimental conditions, and 
the mean was subtracted from single epochs in the post-stimulus interval. The CSP 
algorithm is commonly used to separate two classes of data by determining the spatial 
filters W that maximize the variance of one class while simultaneously minimizing the 
variance of another class. In our data, one class contained the data of the pre-stimulus 
interval (from 500 to 0 ms) and the other class contained the data of the post-stimulus 
interval (±250 ms around the ERD peak previously identified in Laplace transformed C3 
channel). In the case of bandpass-filtered EEG-signals, variance is equivalent to power in a 
given frequency range (Benjamin Blankertz, Dornhege, Krauledat, Müller, & Curio, 2005; 
Dornhege, Blankertz, & Curio, 2003; Nierula et al., 2013; Nikulin et al., 2008), which 
means that CSP can be also used to optimize ERD (Lemm, Müller, & Curio, 2009). CSP 
has been successfully used to classify single EEG epochs during motor imagery (Benjamin 
Blankertz et al., 2005; Dornhege et al., 2003; Koles et al., 1995; Nikulin et al., 2008). The 
inverse of the filter matrix W is the CSP and it contains components/patterns that were 
sorted by the size of their eigenvalue from high to low. Within the first four patterns we 
selected the pattern with the strongest eigenvalue that represented activity in sensorimotor 
areas. Patterns were validated by splitting all epochs into two sets. Only patterns that 
appeared in both sets were considered for further analysis. 
Source reconstruction of CSP patterns 
Source reconstruction of CSP patterns was performed using Brainstorm (Tadel, Baillet, 
Mosher, Pantazis, & Leahy, 2011). The forward model was generated with OpenMEEG 
using the symmetric Boundary Element Method (Gramfort, Papadopoulo, Olivi, & Clerc, 
2010; Kybic et al., 2005) on the cortical surface of a Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 
brain template (non-linear MNI-ICBM152 atlas (Fonov et al., 2011)) with a resolution of 1 
mm. Cortical sources were then estimated using the Tikhonov-regularized minimum-norm 
(Baillet, Mosher, & Leahy, 2001) with a Tikhonov parameter of λ=10% of maximum 
singular value of the lead field, and mapped to a distributed source model consisting of 
15 000 current dipoles. Sources of CSP patterns were visually inspected for their origin in 
sensorimotor areas. Fig. 3A displays the inverse solutions averaged over all 18 participants, 
which was strongest at coordinates X=52.5, Y=7.5 and Z=52.9 in the MNI space. Mean 
sources were located in the precentral gyrus (Fig. 3A). 
ERD 
The extracted spatial filter W from the CSP pattern used for source analysis was also used 
to project the data X from the three conditions (MotorImagery, SSVEP, and Observe) using 
the following formula: Z=WX. To obtain ERD%, we extracted the amplitude envelope of 
the analytic signal with the Hilbert transform and then calculated ERD% (Nierula et al., 
2013) using the formula above. The minimum value of ERD% during the preparation phase 
was later used for statistical comparisons. 
EMG and EOG 
The EMG recordings were high-pass filtered at 10 Hz and EOG recordings were low-pass 
filtered at 50 Hz. Both filtered EMG and EOG recordings were then segmented into epochs 
from 2000 to 8000 ms with respect to the arrow indicating one of the two buttons. The 
root-mean square values were calculated during the motor preparation phase (from 0 to 
6000 ms) to obtain measures of motor activation (MA) in the right anterior part of the 
deltoid muscle and eye movement (EM). 
MA and EM served as covariates in order to control for experiences of agency triggered by 
attributing eye or muscle movements to the virtual movement. Therefore, before fitting a 
statistical model we checked whether MA or EM could explain some of the variance. 
Statistics 
All statistical tests were performed using Stata 13 (StataCorp LP, College Station, TX). 
Residuals were tested for normality when necessary using the Shapiro–Wilk test. 
Violations of the sphericity assumption were tested with Mauchly’s sphericity test. 
IBrokeObject and ITouchedObject were merged to the variable ResponsibilityPCF, and the 
items IControlledArm, MyMovement, and ArmMovedItself were merged to the variable 
AgencyPCF using a principal component factor analysis. The resulting interval scaled 
variables were analyzed with a multilevel mixed-effects regression (the “mixed” function in 
Stata) with “condition” as fixed-effects and “individual subject” as random effects. For post 
hoc analyses we used the Scheffé post hoc criterion for significance. ERD% was analyzed 
using repeated measures ANOVA with factor “condition” and post hoc comparisons were 
performed using the Scheffé criterion. Because of its ordinal nature, MyBody reports were 
analyzed with a multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic regression (the “meologit” 
function in Stata) with “condition” as fixed effects and “individual subject” as random 
effects. Likelihood ratio tests were used to identify if the variables MA or EM should be 
added as covariates to each model. Relationships between variables were assessed with 
mixed-effects regression (the “mixed” function in Stata). 
Results 
Agency ratings 
Agency has been measured in the literature as the sense of control over an action (Synofzik 
et al., 2008), as the sense of having caused/produced an outcome (Bednark & Franz, 2014; 
Kumar & Srinivasan, 2014), and as the sense that an action is one’s own and not another 
person’s (Weiss, Tsakiris, Haggard, & Schütz-Bosbach, 2014). In order to have a single 
measure for agency, we performed a principal component factor analysis on the 
questionnaire items indicating agency (IControlledArm, MyMovement, and 
ArmMovedItself; see Table 1), which resulted in a single variable accounting for 81% of 
variance. We refer to this variable as AgencyPCF.  
A mixed-effects regression revealed an effect of condition on AgencyPCF (z=6.64, 
P<0.001), indicating that participants experienced higher levels of AgencyPCF over the 
virtual movement during the Motor Imagery than during the Observe condition (Scheffé 
z=6.64, P<0.001) and during the SSVEP conditions (Scheffé z=2.53, P=0.041), and 
participants experienced higher levels of AgencyPCF during the SSVEP than during the 
Observe condition (Scheffé z=4.12, P<0.001). Our data show that activating motor areas to 
induce the movement of the virtual arm elicited a higher sense of agency over the action 
than activating visual areas, and merely observing the virtual arm move elicited the lowest 
sense of agency (see Fig. 2A).  
Responsibility ratings 
Agency is closely related to the feeling of responsibility because it tells us when we are 
responsible for the results of action and when we are not (Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009). To 
measure the levels of experienced responsibility, we introduced for each condition four 
random trials in which the virtual arm “accidentally” threw an object off the table and 
broke it (Supplementary Information, video). We asked participants directly after this 
incident how strongly they felt responsible for breaking the object (item IBrokeObject). 
One of these four trials was a catch trial, which we used to test if our measure was working. 
In this trial the object fell off the table although the virtual hand did not touch it. This trial 
was not part of the IBrokeObject measure (see Methods for more details). The results on 
how well our measure worked are reported in the Supplementary Material. Moreover, once 
the condition (Motor Imagery, SSVEP or Observe) was over, participants were also asked 
whether they considered they had touched the object out of sloppiness (item 
ITouchedObject). We merged these two responsibility-related questionnaire items to the 
variable ResponsibilityPCF using a principal component factor analysis. A mixed-effects 
regression revealed an effect of condition on ResponsibilityPCF (z=4.66, P<0.001), 
wherein participants gave higher ratings during MotorImagery than during Observe 
(Scheffé z=4.66, P<0.001) or during SSVEP (Scheffé z=3.34, P=0.004), whereas there was 
no difference between the SSVEP and the Observe conditions (Scheffé z=1.18, not 
significant, n.s.). Our results show therefore that activating motor areas to induce the virtual 
arm movement led to a significantly higher sense of responsibility than using visual areas 
or merely observing the movement (Fig. 2B). 
Body ownership ratings 
Body ownership and agency are closely related. For example, only when feeling high levels 
of body ownership over a surrogate body can people experience illusions of agency over 
the actions of that body (Banakou & Slater, 2014; Kokkinara et al., 2016) or even perceive 
action errors as their own (Padrao, Gonzalez-Franco, Sanchez-Vives, Slater, & Rodriguez-
Fornells, 2016). To capture the participant’s experienced level of body ownership we asked 
them to rate it at the end of each condition (see Table 1 questionnaire item MyBody). A 
mixed-effects ordered logistic regression revealed an effect of condition on MyBody 
(z=3.40, P=0.001; Fig. 2), showing that ratings were highest during Motor Imagery 
compared to Observe (Scheffé z=3.40, P=0.001) and SSVEP (Scheffé z=2.22, P=0.026); 
during the Observe and SSVEP conditions ratings did not differ (Scheffé z=1.37, n.s). Our 
data show that participants had highest levels of body ownership during Motor Imagery, 
while during SSVEP and Observe conditions they reported body ownership at similarly 
intermediate levels (Fig. 2C). 
Activity in sensorimotor areas 
Agency has been proposed to result from the match between predicted and actual sensory 
feedback of a planned motor action, a process that involves sensorimotor areas (Frith et al., 
2000; Giummarra, Gibson, Georgiou-Karistianis, & Bradshaw, 2008). To test the different 
levels of sensorimotor activity induced by the experimental conditions we first recorded 
EEG activity in 18 of the 29 included participants while they pressed a button with their 
right arm (a movement that replicates the virtual one). Applying common spatial pattern 
(CSP) analysis to the executed movement data, we obtained spatial filters of sensorimotor 
activity, which we used to project the EEG signal of the three conditions and then calculate 
the event-related desynchronization (ERD) of the somatosensory alpha rhythm in 18 
participants (Fig. 3B displays ERD% of the projected signal). We compared minimum 
ERD% in the different conditions during the preparation phase, which corresponds to a 
time window of 6 s before participants saw the virtual movement and in which they either 
imagined the movement, focused at the blinking light, or simply observed. A repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with fixed-effect condition revealed that there was 
an effect of condition on ERD% (F (2,34)=12.70, P<0.001), wherein ERD% was highest 
during MotorImagery compared to SSVEP (Scheffé t=–3.29, P=0.009) and Observe 
(Scheffé t=–4.95, P<0.001). The SSVEP and Observe conditions did not differ (Scheffé t=–
1.66, n.s.) (Table 1). Our data show that our experimental paradigm triggered processing in 
the sensorimotor cortex during the preparation phase and that corresponding levels of 
neural activity were highest during MotorImagery, and low during SSVEP and Observe 
conditions. 
In order to relate sensorimotor activity to the sense of agency, as has been proposed by 
computational models of agency (Blakemore et al., 2000; Frith et al., 2000) as well as 
models that take a cognitive component of agency into account (Synofzik et al., 2008), we 
investigated the relationship between ERD% and agency-related questionnaire reports. We 
found that greater sensorimotor activity, which is reflected in negative ERD%, was 
associated with a higher sense of agency and responsibility. Specifically, a mixed-effects 
regression revealed a negative relationship between ERD% and both AgencyPCF (Fig. 3C; 
z=–3.02, P=0.003) and ResponsibilityPCF (Fig. 3D; z=–4.56, P<0.001). There was no 
significant relationship between ERD% and MyBody (z=–2.22, P=0.026). We then 
examined whether these relationships were also present within conditions. A mixed-effects 
regression revealed a negative relationship between ERD% and ResponsibilityPCF (z=–
2.84, P=0.004) in the MotorImagery condition, but not in the two other conditions 
(Observe: z=–1.27, n.s.; SSVEP: z=1.33, n.s.), indicating that when participants 
intentionally activated sensorimotor areas, the strength of sensorimotor activity was related 
to their feeling of responsibility; that is, the stronger the activity the higher the feeling of 
responsibility. There was no relationship between ERD% and AgencyPCF in any of the 
three conditions (Observe: z=–0.10, n.s.; SSVEP: z=–0.25, n.s.; Motor Imagery: z=–0.50, 
n.s.) and no relationship between ERD% and MyBody (Observe: z=–0.70, n.s.; SSVEP: 
z=1.97, P=0.048; MotorImagery: z=–1.13, n.s.). Our data therefore demonstrates that the 
stronger the sensorimotor areas' activation, the higher the subjective experience of agency 
and responsibility.  
Debriefing 
Finally, in order to get an overall idea of how much control participants felt over the virtual 
movement during the different conditions, we asked them to give an overall rating at the 
end of the experiment. For this rating, participants were asked to order the conditions from 
strongest to weakest according to their experienced sense of control over the virtual arm 
movement (IControlledArm). Out of 29 participants, 22 reported strongest feelings of 
control during Motor Imagery, followed by SSVEP, and during the Observe condition the 
lowest feeling of control over the virtual arm movement was reported (Fig. S5). 
Discussion 
With the present work we have demonstrated that BCI-controlled movements engender 
agency, being higher during this conditions than during the observation of a passive 
movement of the ‘own’ body. Furthermore, the highest agency is induced by BCI based on 
the activation of sensorimotor areas (motor imagery paradigms). Interestingly, BCI based 
on activation of visual areas (SSVEP paradigms), engendered elevated levels of agency 
compared to movement observation, but not a higher sense of responsibility. Our analysis 
also revealed that the higher the activation of sensorimotor areas, the higher the reported 
levels of agency and responsibility. The implications of these findings should be considered 
at different levels: (1) on the neural basis of agency and responsibility for actions, (2) on 
executive aspects of which BCI paradigms should  be used for different purposes, and (3) 
on the ethical implications of controlling actions by thinking and the subjective 
responsibility over the consequences that this  may imply.  
Higher agency but not responsibility levels for intended 
movements 
Voluntary actions can be described by an intention–action–outcome chain (Roskies, 2010). 
In this chain, intentions are linked to actions by an action selection process, which is the 
basis for the motor plan. In addition to the selected action, the motor plan also computes its 
expected sensory feedback (Frith et al., 2000), and a comparison between intended and 
expected sensory feedback has been proposed to produce a sense of initiation (de 
Vignemont & Fourneret, 2004). The action selection process occurs after the formation of 
the intention but before its execution through an action. In an experimental setup priming 
can be used to bias the action selection process by making some actions easier to access 
than others. Participants report reduced feelings of agency when such breaks between the 
intention–action link are present (Valérian Chambon, Sidarus, & Haggard, 2014; Valerian 
Chambon, Wenke, Fleming, Prinz, & Haggard, 2013; Wenke, Fleming, & Haggard, 2010). 
Actions are also linked to their outcome through a comparator mechanism (Frith et al., 
2000), which has been proposed to create a sense of one’s own movement and contribute, 
together with the sense of initiation (de Vignemont & Fourneret, 2004) and other cognitive 
processes (Synofzik et al., 2008), to the sense of agency. One difference between inducing 
the movement of a virtual limb through BCI and merely observing the movement is that in 
the latter condition no intention is generated, while to operate a BCI it is necessary to 
generate intention. Therefore, BCI-control should lead to a greater sense of agency than 
mere observation. Our data confirmed this prediction for perceived levels of agency but not 
for responsibility. Participants perceived higher levels of agency when an intention was 
generated before seeing the virtual movement, such as in the two BCI conditions, compared 
to when there was no intention; that is, when participants observed the movement (see Fig. 
2). On the other hand, participants’ feelings of responsibility over the consequences of a 
given action, such as the virtual arm accidentally breaking an object in the virtual scenario, 
were higher only when they induced the virtual movement by the activation of 
sensorimotor areas. Contrarily, when the movement was induced by visually-evoked 
potentials the feeling of responsibility was similar to when participants simply observed the 
movement without being able to control it. One possible interpretation is that the intention 
to perform a ask , per se, is not a determining factor for the feeling of responsibility to 
arise.  
Importance of body ownership 
Illusory agency is a phenomenon that can also give clues about the neural basis of agency. 
When experiencing illusory agency, one attributes to the self the visual or auditory 
feedback of an action that was not performed by oneself (Banakou & Slater, 2014; 
Kokkinara et al., 2016; Wegner et al., 2004). Such illusory experiences of agency have 
been reported for example when participants feel high levels of body ownership over a 
surrogate body (Banakou & Slater, 2014; Kokkinara et al., 2016). Body ownership over 
virtual bodies can be induced by visuotactile (Slater et al., 2008) and visuomotor (Sanchez-
Vives et al., 2010) correlations. Furthermore, ownership over a virtual arm can be induced 
through an SMR-based BCI, such that imagining a movement and seeing a virtual arm 
move from a first-person perspective is sufficient to induce certain levels of body 
ownership (Perez-Marcos, Slater, & Sanchez-Vives, 2009). Our findings are in line with the 
existing literature and expand the current knowledge on this topic: participants reported the 
highest feelings of body ownership when they induced the virtual movement through motor 
imagery; when inducing it through visually evoked potentials or when simply observing, 
the levels of body ownership were lower (see Fig. 2). Since in the present study self-
attribution of the virtual body’s movement was mainly based on visual feedback, the role of 
body ownership is crucial for attributing an action to the self (Banakou & Slater, 2014; 
Kilteni & Ehrsson, 2017; Kokkinara et al., 2016; Wegner et al., 2004). Motor imagery and 
motor execution of the same movement are believed to activate similar neural networks 
(Ehrsson, Kuhtz-Buschbeck, & Forssberg, 2002; Gerardin et al., 2000; Pfurtscheller, 
Scherer, Muller-Putz, & Lopes da Silva, 2008). This could mean that the brain predicts not 
only the sensory feedback of a planned (and executed) action, but also the feedback of an 
imagined one. If this holds true, it could explain why all agency-related questionnaire items 
have the highest ratings when participants imagined the movement. 
The sense of responsibility for BCI actions 
In order to feel responsible for the outcome of an action, the action should be performed by 
oneself. The sense of agency can give us this information and thereby creates the basis for a 
feeling of responsibility over that action (Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009). Experiencing high 
levels of agency over one’s own movements should therefore lead to high levels of 
responsibility. Based on this we measured in this study the sense of agency and the sense of 
responsibility, and expected both to show similar response patterns. Indeed, we found a 
similar pattern in agency and responsibility: for both, imagining the movement induces the 
highest levels, while observing the movement induces the lowest levels. Interestingly, 
however, we found a dissociation of agency and responsibility when the movement was 
induced by visually evoked potentials. While visually evoked potentials induced higher 
levels of agency compared with observation, and lower levels compared to imagining the 
movement, BCI through SSVEP did not induce higher responsibility levels than mere 
movement observation. Importantly, we also found that when imagining the movement, the 
level of activity in sensorimotor areas was positively correlated with the level of reported 
responsibility, meaning more sensorimotor activity was associated with higher 
responsibility ratings. It has been previously shown that when people see another person’s 
hand making movements at a position where they would expect their real hand to be, and 
when they are primed with auditory instructions given via headphones to make the hand 
movements, people feel illusory agency over the other person’s movements (Wegner et al., 
2004). This priming can also be seen as an expectation of movement and when the 
participant creates an intention instead of the expectation, as is the case in the two BCI 
conditions, its effect should be at least similar, and possibly even stronger. Therefore, for 
responsibility, the combination of intention and seeing the virtual arm movement at an 
expected position is not sufficient. It has also been also suggested that for BCI actions the 
visual feedback dominates the sense of agency (Evans et al., 2015), meaning that poorly 
controlled BCI actions can result in a high sense of agency when the visual feedback 
matches the participant’s intended direction. In this experiment we manipulated the level of 
sensorimotor involvement and whether there is an intention or not. In line with Evans et al., 
(2015) our data shows that the sense of agency is higher when participants had formed an 
intention. However, our data further shows that when sensorimotor areas are involved in a 
BCI action participants report higher levels of agency and only then report responsibility. 
Therefore, in order to induce high feelings of responsibility it seems reasonable to suggest 
that the brain should create a motor plan.  
Clinical perspective 
Immersive virtual reality allows to combine of virtual embodiment with action observation 
and motor imagery. This is a promising approach for therapeutic applications, for example,  
in the field of neurological rehabilitation where they cold foster remediation (see Buccino 
(2014); Buccino et al. (2006), for reviews). Another possible applications are in the field of 
pain perception where body image might be distorted (Llobera et al., 2013; Moseley, 2004), 
or for improving the integration of prosthesis into the body representation. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Questionnaire items answered by participants before, during, or after each 
experimental condition (in Spanish in the original). Responses were given on a visual 
analogue scale (VAS) ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly agree”), except 
for item 3. Note that reversed wording was used for item 4 and therefore the inverse of the 
original scale was used for further analysis. 
Variable Questionnaire item Item tag 
MyBody (1) It felt as if the right virtual arm were my arm. MyBody 
AgencyPCF 
(2) It felt as if it were me who controlled the movement of the 
virtual arm. 
IControlledArm 
(3) It felt as if the movement of the virtual arm were… the 
movement of another person (= 0 on VAS) / my movement (= 
10 on VAS). 
MyMovement 
(4) It felt as if the virtual arm moved by itself. ArmMovedItself 
(5) It felt as if it were me who produced the sound (when the 
hand touched the button). 
MySound 
ResponsibilityPCF 
(6) It felt as if it were me who broke the vase/pencil 
holder/glass/cup. 
IBrokeObject 
(7) It felt that out of sloppiness I touched the objects with my 
hand when they fell off the table. 
ITouchedObject 
 
 
Figures and legends 
Fig. 1. Experimental setup. (A) Participants sat with both hands resting on a table and saw 
through a head mounted display (HMD) a virtual body co-located with their real body, over 
which body ownership was induced in an initial embodiment phase. (B) During the action 
phase, in which participants were instructed not to move their arms, each trial started with a 
fixation cross, (C) followed by an arrow indicating one of two buttons to indicate the task, 
which was to bring the hand towards to pointed to-button. (D) In two conditions 
participants controlled the movement of the virtual arm through a BCI and in a third control 
condition they simply observed the virtual arm move. 
 
Fig. 2. Agency, responsibility and body ownership ratings in the three experimental 
conditions (passive observation, SSVEP-BCI and motor imagery-BCI). AgencyPCF 
(A), ResponsibilityPCF (B), and MyBody (C) ratings. The Boxplots include all participants 
(n=29) who completed all conditions. The definition of these variables can be found in 
Results and Methods. See Table 1 for the questionnaire items associated with the variables. 
∗: P ≤ 0.05, ∗∗: P ≤ 0.01, ∗∗∗: P ≤ 0.001. 
 
Fig. 3. Brain activation during BCI-controlled and passive movements of the virtual 
arm and its relation to agency and responsibility. (A) Average sources of Executed 
Movement from 18 participants. The active area during this task coincides with the 
precentral gyrus (Brodmann’s area 6). The images display left hemisphere, top view with 
both hemispheres, and right hemisphere from left to right. R=rostral. (B) Event-related 
desynchronization (ERD) of the alpha rhythm as a marker of sensorimotor activation in the 
three conditions MotorImagery, SSVEP, and Observe. The signals, recorded during the 
three conditions, were projected through spatial filters, obtained by applying CSP on 
executed movement data, and transformed to ERD%. Zero (0) indicates the display of the 
arrow, after which participants started to observe, look at the blinking light or imagining the 
movement (depending on the condition). After 6000 ms the virtual arm started moving—in 
the Observe condition in every trial and in the BCI conditions when the action was 
classified accordingly. The plotted signal is averaged over n=18 participants. Only correctly 
classified trials were taken into account. (C) ERD% during Observe (in black), SSVEP (in 
blue), and MotorImagery (in red) plotted against AgencyPCF, (D) and ResponsibilityPCF. 
Note that the x-axis is inverted. More negative ERD% values indicate higher sensorimotor 
cortex activity. Lines indicate the linear fit of the questionnaire item on ERD%. 
